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1 Introduction 
Recent concerns over environmental issues like the greenhouse effect, the 
depletion of the ozone layer, or acidification of soil make clear that pollu-
tion control strategies of countries can best be studied by using dynamic 
game model~_-(see Clem.bout and \Van [1991), Hoel [1990) Kaitala et al. 
[1991) and Long [1991].)1 Game theoretic models of international pollution 
control afe capable of explaining why and when negotiations about bilat-
eral emission re9-uctions fail, how bilateral agreements come about, and 
why once an agreement over emission controls is reached _countries have a 
unilateral incentive to deviate from this agreement. 
In this paper we formulate a simple dynamic game that is interpreted 
as a two country pollution model and address some of these coordination 
issues. Each country is assumed to produce a single good that is consumed 
at home but its production emits pollutants that are added to the existing 
stock of pollution which is common to both countries (stock externality). 
Consumers derive positive utility from consuming the good and costs from 
the current stock of pollution. 
The level of pollution can be controlled through the amount of pollu-
tants emitted with the production process. It is the government in each 
country that decides upon the pollution control strategy. Assuming benev-
olent governments we study two fundamentally different scenarios: one in 
which they are able to reach a pollution control agreement ( cooperative 
scenario) and one in which they fail to do so (non-cooperative scenario). 
It turns out that 'Yhen the governments are restricted to use global linear 
strategies non-cooperative behaviour results in overall losses for both coun-
tries. This is reflected in higher steady state pollution stocks as well as 
lower net benefits for the consumers. Desirable cooperative outcomes on 
the other hand are shown not to possess an equilibrium property. Hence, 
without binding agreements or threats there always exists an incentive for . 
one country to unilaterally deviate from the agreement, i.e., the coopera-
tive outcome is Pareto-efficient but not an equilibrium. If, on the contrary, 
governments use nonlinear Markov-perfect strategies and the discount rate 
1 For an excellent introduction to game theoretic modelling in environmental economics 
see Weimann [1990). 
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is small enough a Pareto-efficient steady state pollution stock can be sup-
ported as a differentiable subgame perfect equilibrium. This is an interest-
ing result and has the follov,ing implications. Neither trigger strategies nor 
any kind of retaliation mechanism is necessary to bring about cooperative 
outcomes. The emergence of cooperati,·e outcomes requires a sophisticated 
choice of nonlinear Markov strategies as well as a sufficiently low rate of 
discount. 
The paper is organized as follm11·s. In the next section we present the 
pollution control model. In Section 3 the coordinated pollution control 
strategy is derived. This coordinated strategy constitutes a benchmark for 
non-coordinated strategies that are derived in Section 4. Finally; Section 5 
concludes the paper. · 
2 The lVf odel 
There are t\vo countries, indexed by i = 1, 2. Each country produces a 
single consumption good, Qi, with a given fixed endowment of factors of 
production and a given technology. The production of a unit of the con-
sumption good results in an amount of pollutants, Ei, given by the following 
emission consumption trade-off function (see Forster [1973], [1975]): 
(1) 
The "technology" F;(Ei) indicates how much pollutants are produced when 
the current output of country i is Qi. F;(.) is assumed to be strictly concave 
and to satisfy Fi(O) = 0. 
The amount of pollutants emitted today by both countries adds to the 
current stock of pollution, P(t), according to the following kinematic equa-
tion 
(2) 
with the initial stock P(O) = P0 . In equation (2) it is assumed that the 
natural purification is proportional to the existing stock P(t), i.e., kP(t). 
Consumers in each country derive utility from consuming Qi given by 
Ui(Q;) and face costs of the polluted environment given by Ci(P). Con-
sumer preferences, Ui, are assumed to be strictly concave and the cost 
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functions Ci are strictly convex. Net benefits of a representative consumer 
in country i in period t are given by 
l~(Qi(t),P(t)) = Ui(Qi(t))- Ci(P(t)). (3) 
Using the emission consumption trade-off function~ net benefits in period 
t can be represented as 
l1Vi(Ei(t), P(t)) . Ui(F1(Ei(t))) - Ci(P(t)). (4) 
The objective of each government is to choose a pollution control strat-
egy Ei(t) (or equivalently an ouput strategy) that maximizes the discounted 
stream of net benefits from consumption of a representative consumer, i.e., 
max ["':> e-rt[Ui(Fi(Ei(t))) - Ci(P(t))]dt, 
E; lo (5) 
subject to the accumulation equation (2) and the initial condition. r is the 
discount rate that is assumed constant and identical for both countries. 
(5) and (2) constitutes a dynamic two player game for which we will 
derive cooperative (Pareto-optimal) as well as non-cooperative strategies. 
The outcome of the cooperative game is interpreted as the scenario where 
the countries are able to reach a pollution control agreement (they co-
ordinate their control efforts), non- cooperative equilibrium outcomes are 
interpreted as the scenario where they fail to do so. 
3 Coordinated Pollution Control 
As a reference scenario we look at the cooperative outcome of the game. 
Any cooperative outcome constitutes a first best solution but requires pre-
play communication that is not explicitly modeled in this paper. 
To characterize first best solutions for our model we impose some addi-
tional assumptions on the functional forms of preferences and technologies. 2 
In particular, we assume that the cost functions, Ci, are quadratic, 
Ci(P(t)) = iP2(t) 
20ur specification of explicit functional forms is motivated by the choice of the strategy 
spaces for the non-cooperative game (Markov-perfect strategy spaces). Only for specific 
classes of differential games existence and other qualitative properties of Markov-perfect 
equilibria can be derived analytically. 
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where s > 0, and that the preferences of consumers and the emission con-
sumption trade-off functions are such that Ui(~(Ei(t))) becomes quadratic, 
i.e., 
where A> 0. 
'\Vith these simplifications our pollution model becomes a linear quadratic 
game, 1.e., 
(6) 
subject to 
P(t) = E1(t) + E2(t) - kP(t), Po given. (7) 
To solve for the cooperative game we make use of Pontryagin's maxi-
mum principle (see Leonard and Long [1991)). In particular, we calculate 
the collusive solution that is obatined by maximizing joint welfare of both 
countries. This amounts to solving a simple one state variable optimal 
control problem. '\Ve formulate the current value Hamiltonian3 
where >. is the current value adjoint variable. 
It is easily shown that the collusive game admits a unique solution that 
is characterized by the following necessary and sufficient conditions: (i) the 
maximum conditions 
H E1 = 0 => A + ). = Ei, 
HE-i = 0 => A+>.= E2, 
(ii) the adjoint equation 
~ = ( r + k )>. + 2s P, 
and (iii) the transversality condition 
lim >.(t)P(t) = 0. 
t-oo 
3From now on, unless otherwise stated we suppress the time argument t. 
4 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
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The necessary conditions can be summarized in the canonical equations 
given by 
P - 2A - kP + 2,\ 
,\ - 2sP + (r + k),\ 
(13) 
(14) 
with the initial condition Po and the boundary condition (12). The unique 
collusive solution has to satisfy system (13) and (14). 
Proposition 1 There exists a unique globally and asymptotically stable 
collusive outcome that results in a steady state pollution stock given by 
pC _ 2A(r + k) 
- k(r+k)+4s· 
Net benefits are given by 
1 2 1 µc W1 = TV.2 = --a P.0 - -/3 Ro - -4c 2c 2' 
where 
Oc - ~[-(k + ~) + ✓(k + ~)2 + 4s], 
2Aac 
f3c - r+ k+2ac' 
(f3c - A)2 
r 
(15) 
(16) 
(16 a) 
(16 b) 
(16 c) 
Proof: It is easily seen that system (13) and (14) admits a unique steady 
state that is saddle-point stable. The steady state pollution stock (15) can 
be calculated as the solution to the equation system P = ,\ = 0. Discounted 
net welfare for each country can be calculated using dynamic programming 
techniques. \Ve define the value function as 
1 100 1 s 
-TV(Po) = max e-rt[AEi(t) - -E;(t) - -P2(t)]dt. 
2 0 2 2 
(17) 
The value function has to satisfy the dynamic programming equation 
rTV(P) = max{A(E1+E2)--2
1 (Ef+EJ)-sP2+TV'(P)[E1+E2-kP]}. (18) 
E1,E2 
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Given the linear quadratic structure of the dynamic game we guess a 
quadratic value function 
Comparing coefficients leads to the desired results (16). In (16a), the pos-
itive root is choosen as required by the saddle-point stability. Q.E.D. 
The first best solution determines the reference levels of the long-run 
pollution stock and welfare that can be achieved through international co-
ordination of pollution controls. This outcome, hmvever, is not structurally 
stable, i.e., the collusive outcome does not admit an equilibrium property. 
Hence, unilateral deviations can make one of the players better off. There-
fore the problem arises as to what mechanism to use to ensure that the 
collusive outcome is sustained by a pair of equilibrium strategies. If it is 
a Nash equilibrium then there are no incentives for individual players to 
unilaterally deviate from the agreement. 
The literature on supergames (see for example Friedman [1986]) pro-
vides some guidelines. The enforcement for both countries to stick to their 
initially agreed upon cooperative strategies can be achieved through cred-
ible threats and retaliation summarized in so called trigger strategy equi-
libria. These equilibria are subgame perfect aµd are implemented in the 
following way: As long as a player's opponent plays the cooperative strategy 
the other player honors this behavior by playing the cooperative strategy 
himself. If the opponent deviates the other player punishes this behavior 
by switching to any non-cooperative strategy that constitutes a credible 
threat, i.e., really makes the opponent worse off and hence punishes him. 
In this paper we do not follow the route of constructing trigger strategy 
equilibria. Instead, we allow the countries to play nonlinear Markov-perfect 
strategies and demonstrate that such choices can support first best solutions 
as equilibrium outcomes. The nonlinear strategies that we are going to 
derive are, however, not global strategies, i.e., are not defined globally for 
any initial value of the state space. But we will characterize the subsets 
of the state space for which they can be derived. Before discussing the 
nonlinear strategies we calculate a unique linear Markov-perfect equilibrium 
for our game that is supported by a pair of global strategies. 
6 
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4 Non-Cooperative Pollution Control 
In the preceeding section we have characterized the first best solution that 
can be achieved if both countries are able to reach a pollution control agree-
ment. In this section we look at the non-cooperative game and characterize 
its equilibrium outcomes. This requires a detailed description of the strat-
egy spaces available for the two players in the game. Here we choose that 
both goverments use Markov strategies. This choice implies that the cor-
responding outcomes are subgame-perfect and do not require any commit-
ment on the part of either government. Formally, Markov-perfect strategies 
are decision rules that result in actions of the respective players conditional 
on the current state variable that summarizes the latest available informa-
tion of the dynamical system. Markov strategy spaces for differential games 
are defined as 4 
sfIP = {Ei(P(t), t) I Ei(P(t), t) is Lipschitz-continuous w.r.t. P(t) 
and continuous w.r.t. t} 
Markov-perfect equilibria are subgame-perfect equilibria in which play-
ers use Markov strategies. They can be derived through the application 
of dynamic programming techniques. In what follows we allow the gov-
ernments to play linear as well as non-linear Markov-perfect equilibrium 
strategies. 
4.1 Linear Markov Strategies 
When players are restricted to linear Markov strategies they design their 
equilibrium strategies as linear state dependent decision rules, i.e., 
Ei(P(t)) = aiP(t) + fii, 
where O'.i and f3i are constants that are independent of the initial conditions 
of the game. 
4In the traditional differential games literature (see Ba.§ar and Olsder [1982]) Markov 
strategies are referred to as feedback or closed-loop (subgame-perfect) strategies. For a 
discussion of Markov strategies, see Maskin and Tirole (1988, especially p. 553). 
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Proposition 2 There exists a unique pair of linear Jfarkov strategies that 
constitute an asymptotically stable ~Markov-perfect equilibrium that results 
in a steady state pollution stock given by 
pMP = 2A(r + k + O'm) 
(k + 2am)(r + k + 3a-m) (19) 
The steady state pollution level corresponding to the non-cooperative Markov-
perfect equilibrium exceeds that of the cooperative game. 
Discounted net welfare in the non-cooperative game is given by 
(20) 
where 
O'm ~[-(k + ~) + j(k + ~)2 + 3s], 
2Aam 
f3m - r + k + 3am' 
(/Jm - A)2 (/Jm - A)(A - 2/3m) 
µm = - 2 + . 
r r 
Proof: As noted, Markov-perfect equilibria can be derived through dy-
namic programming techniques. They have to satisfy the dynamic pro-
gramming equations (see Basar and Olsder [19821): 
1 s 
rlV;(P) = max{AE; - -E; - -2P
2 + 1v:(P)[E; + Ei - kP]}. 
Ei 2 
(21) 
Given the linear-quadratic structure of the game we restrict attention to 
the class of quadratic value-functions l,Vi(P): 
1 2 lV;(P) = -20'mP - f3mP - µm, (22) 
where O'm, f3m and µm are to be determined. Maximization of the right hand 
side of (21) yields 
(23) 
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Substituting the ,a.lue function and the maximization condition into the 
Bellman equations results in 
Since the last equation has to hold for any level of P we get 
1 r I r 
O'.m 3[-(k + 2) ± y(k + 2)2 + 3s), 
2Aam 
f3m - r + k + 3am ' 
_ (/Jm - A)2 + (/Jm - A)(A - 2/Jm). 
µm = 2r r 
(24 a) 
(24 b) 
(24 c) 
To guarantee stability of the steady state pollution stock we restrict our 
analysis to the positive root for O'.m. The steady state stock level is given 
by 
pMP _ 2A(r + k + am) 
- (k + 2am)(r + k + 3am)° (25) 
It is now easily seen that the non-cooperative stock level exceeds the coop-
erative one.5 Q.E.D. 
The last result has the following implications. Firstly, it demonstrates 
that non-cooperative behavior of the two governments results in higher 
long-run pollution levels than coordination of pollution control. Secondly, 
non-cooperative behavior modeled as linear Markov-perfect equilibrium is 
inefficient. This inefficiency is an immediate consequence of the stock as 
well as the strategic externality that are present in the model ( equation (2) ). 
When the two countries play linear Markov-perfect equilibrium strategies 
5From (24), s = 3o~ + (2k + r)om. Therefore 
pMP= 2A(r+k+o-m) >Pc 
k(r + k) + 4s - 60~ - 2o-mr - 3omk · 
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their behavior is respresented by the decision rules (23). These rules imply 
that with an increase (decrease) in the stock P( t) optimal emissions and 
hence production should be decreased (increased). Suppose that country 1 
finds it optimal to drastically reduce its emissions. This causes the level of 
the pollution stock to decline. Since a clean em·ironment in this model is 
a public good the neighbor country benefits from this decline in pollution 
and reacts according to the decision rule (23) by producing more and hence 
increasing the level of pollutants. In long-run equilibrium this behavior 
results in a higher steady state pollution stock. 
4.2 Non-Linear Markov Strateg~es 
The linear Markov-perfect strategy characterized in the preceeding section 
is not the only Markov-perfect equilibrium in differentiable strategies. In 
this section we demonstrate (following Tsutsui and Mino [1990]) that our 
pollution game admits non-linear Markov equilibria. These set of non-
linear equilibria turns out to support a wide range of long-run pollution 
stock levels including the Pareto-efficient one. 
As noted above a Markov-perfect equilibrium has to satisfy the Bellman 
equations 
{ 12 S2, [ } rlV;(P) = mE~ AE; - 2E; - 2P + H';(P) E; + Ei - kP] . (26) 
Using the maximization condition E;-A = Wf(P) and looking at symmet-
ric solutions we get 
rW;(P) = {AE; -1E: - iP 2 + (Ei - A)[2Ei - kP)}. (27) 
Temporarily assuming that the discount rate r = 0, the Bellman equation 
(27) becomes the following quadratic equation in E; (with the subscript 
dropped for simplicity): 
1 2 s 2 0 = AE - 2E - 2P + (E - A)[2E - kP] (28) 
with two non-linear solutions 
E 1,2 =~(A+ kP) ±/(A+ kP)2/9 + sP2 /3-2AkP/3. (29) 
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The last result, in principle, demonstrates the characteristics of the Markov-
perfect equilibria that we are going to derive in this section. Firstly, the 
solutions (29) are highly non-linear and continuously differentiable in the 
state variable P and secondly, they are not defined globally. For (29) to be 
well defined we have to assume that ( A + kP)2 /9 + sP2 /3 - 2AkP /3 2:'.. 0 
holds. This results in a restriction of the state space, i.e., feasible pollution 
levels. 
Guided by the results for r = 0 we guess a non-linear decision rule for 
the general case ( r > 0) as 
1 
E(P) = 3(A + kP) + h(P), (30) 
with h(P) a nonlinear function in P. Substituting (30) into the Bellman 
equation (27) yields 
1 . 2 1 2 3 2 2 s 2 12 3 2 
rlV(P) = - 9A - 18 A - 18k P - 2P + 18AkP + 2h (P). (31) 
Assuming that the value-function lV(P) is continuously differentiable and 
differentiating (31) with respect to P yields 
2 k 3 2 
r[-3A + 3P + h(P)] := - 9k
2 P - sP + 3Ak + 3h(P)h'(P), (32) 
,vhich upon rewriting gives 
rk 1 2A 
3h(P)h'(P) = rh(P) + P[3 + 3k
2 + s] - 3 (k + r). (33) 
Introducing the definition of variables F = rk+k;+3s and C = 2A(~+r) equa-
tion (33) becomes 
h'(P) = rh(P) + PF- C 
3h(P) . (34) 
(34) is a simple first order nonlinear differential equation in P that char-
acterizes non-linear Markov-perfect equilibria. In what follows we are in-
terested in solutions to equation (34). Note that if r = 0 than h(P) = 
-✓( A + kP)2 /9 + sP2 /3 - 2AkP /3 is a solution to (34 ), hence (30) is iden-
tical to (29) in this case. 
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Equation (34) can be rewritten to yield 
dh rh+PF-C 
-=-----dP 3h 
To solve the last equation we introduce a change of variables 
C X=P--F 
so that (35) becomes 
dh FX +rh 
-=---dX 3h 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
The last differential equation is a familiar type of equation that can be 
solved explicitly when introducing Z = i-· This implies 
dZ X- F+rZ-3Z2 
dX - 3Z ' (38) 
or equivalently 
1 . 3Z 
XdX= F+rZ-3Z 2 dZ. (39) 
A solution of (39) is given by 
(40) 
where K is a constant of integration, 
and 
-Zb 
6 = -1 - 6, 6 = zb - Za. 
Solution ( 40) can be rewritten to yield 
A k C A k C& K=[E----P-PZ +z-]6 [E----P-PZb+zb-]. (41) 3 3 a aF 3 3 F 
12 
The set of integral curves given by ( 41) includes two singular solutions given 
by 
k A C 
E =(Z +-)P+--z -
a a 3 3 aF 
k A C 
Eb = (Zb + -)P + - -Zb-3 3 F 
(42) 
(43) 
as well as an uncountable number of hyperbolic curves. Graphically the 
integral curves are depicted in Figure 1. The two straight lines Ea and Eb 
correspond to the two singular solutions. The integral curves of Figure 1 are 
drawn under the assumption of s being sufficiently large. In the limiting 
case of s = 0 (no costs of environmental pollution) our game admits a 
unique stable and efficient equilibrium given by E 1 = E 2 = A and the 
maximum sustainable stock of pollution P = 2( (Eb is the horizontal line 
E = A, if s = 0.) 
Every integral curve in Figure 1 corresponds to a nonlinear Markov 
equilibrium. Integral curves crossing through the steady state curve SS 
( defined by 2E = kP) support different levels of steady state pollution 
stocks. From those different levels of steady state stocks we are interested 
in those that can be supported as asymptotically stable ones. 
Proposition 3 Any pollution level in the interval 
12r A + 36C - 6Ak poo 2A 
6kr+36F-3k2 < < T 
can be supported as an asymptotically stable steady state. 
Proof: As derived, non-linear Markov strategies are given by (30) where 
h(P) corresponds to a solution curve of (40). With these nonlinear strate-
gies the state equation (2) becomes 
P = 2E(P) - kP. 
Linearizing the last equation around the steady state p= = 2E{i00 > gives 
the stability condition 
E'(P00 ) < ~ 
2 
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(44) 
Using (30) this condition can be rewritten to yield 
-2rA + krP00 + 6P00F- 6C k 
------------ < -. 
-6A + 3kP00 6 
(45) 
Keeping in mind that the maximum sustainable pollution stock is P 00 = 2: 
the last inequality implies the result. Q.E.D. 
This last proposition has an important economic implication. It turns 
out that in the limiting case when r tends to zero the collusive long-run 
pollution stock can be supported as a steady state of nonlinear differentiable 
Markov strategies, i.e., P 00 = k;~!s• These nonlinear strategies can be 
reached from the following domains of initial- pollution stock. Nonlinear 
strategies from the region I in Figure 1 can be reached from initial conditions 
lying in the interval [O, A). Strategies from region II can be reached by 
initial conditions lying in the interval (A, P0 ]. This characterizes the local 
nature of the nonlinear Markov strategies. 
What remains to be shown, however, is that the above constructed non-
linear differentiable Markov-perfect strategies constitute equilibrium strate-
gies. 
Proposition 4 For each E(P) - ½(A+ kP) + h(P) given by (41) the 
function W(P) defined by 
W(P) = !{AE(P) - !E2(P) - ~2P
2 + (E(P) - A)[2E(P) - kP]} 
r 2 
is a twice differentiable value-function that generates nonlinear Markov-
perfect equilibria that support steady state pollution stock levels from the 
interval 
12r A + 36C - 6Ak poo 2A 
6kr + 36F - 3k2 < < k 
Proof: A proof of this proposition follows along the arguments outlined in 
Tsutsui and Mino [1990) and will not be repeated here. Q.E.D. 
The last proposition establishes multiplicity as well as existence of non-
linear Markov-perfect strategies. The driving force behind this non-unique-
ness result is the incomplete transversality condition as well as the infinite 
horizon of the dynamic game. It is a well known result (Folk-Theorem) that 
14 
in infinite horizon dynamic games any individually rational payoff vector 
can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
The economic interpretation of our results on nonlinear Markov-perfect 
equilibria in the model of international pollution control is as follows: 
Strictly speaking they imply that if the discount rate is sufficiently low, 
the use of non-linear Markov strategies can be a "substitute" for coordi-
nating environmental policies. Theoretically this is an appealing result but 
what is its policy relevance (normative conclusion)? Can we really infer that 
the best environmental policy is laissez-faire? Certainly not! Firstly, our 
approach makes use of a lot of idealizing assumptions ( deterministic model, 
complete information, symmetry, etc.) that are hardly met. Secondly, the 
non-uniqueness result imposes a non-trivial equilibrium selection problem 
for the two governments. In our case there is an additional difficulty due 
to the local nature of the nonlinear Markov equilibria. It is only if both 
players choose mutually consistent strategies from the uncountable set of 
equilibrium strategies that they maximize v,relfare. Finally, for agents with 
a high enough discount rate policy coordination is still Pareto-superior to 
a laissez-faire policy. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we presented a dynamic game that was interpreted as a model 
of international pollution control. V-le characterized cooperative as well as 
non-cooperative strategies that were identified as coordinated and uncoor-
dinated environmental policies. It turned out that for the class of Markov-
perfect equilibria in linear strategies non-cooperation results in high long-
run pollution stocks as well as in overall inefficiences. If, on the contrary, 
agents use nonlinear Markov strategies and have a low discount rate Pareto-
efficient pollution stock levels can be supported as a long-run equilibrium. 
Theoretically this is a remarkable result and demonstrates that cooperation 
can be brought about through an appropriate choice of Markov-strategies 
without using institutional arrangements like threats, etc. Application of 
this result to actual environmental policies requires some degree of caution. 
As pointed out above, it would be too simplistic to argue that based on our 
results laissez-faire is the best possible environmental policy. 
15 
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